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BONANZA DEVELOPMENT? 
THE SELVA OIL INDUSTRY IN PERU, 1968-1982 
Peru is a resource-rich country whose rather fragile economic growth 
during the course of the century has largely depended on the bringing on-
stream of new, generally capital-intensive projects which have promoted 
raw material exports. Despite its abundance of resources, however, 
Peru's economic history has been disappointing. Thorp and Bertram, in 
their authoritative study of the modern Peruvian economy, have argued 
that the growth process itself was radically flawed and that 'the economic 
trends set in motion by successful export growth have consistently eroded 
the potential for self:sustained development.'1 
After 1968, however, the Peruvian economy changed in one funda-
mental respect; the state took a major part in direct capital formation. 
One important recent study of the mining industry, by David Becker, has 
suggested that this transformation has indeed materially strengthened the 
Peruvian economy and its ability to promote a viable pattern of growth.2 
Becker argues that Peruvian governments since 1968 have pursued a 
strategy of 'bonanza development' in which surplus was to be extracted 
from the traditional export sector (where minerals and oil, rather than 
agriculture, played a key role) in order to foment industrialisation. More-
over, 'bonanza development' consists in using the resource "bonanza" 
for financial support of the state and for purposes of cooptation...but 
coupling these to greatly expanded state activity oriented toward indus-
trial promotion.'3 The term 'bonanza development' does seem extremely 
apt as a description of what post-1968 Peruvian governments have tried 
to do although Becker, in his thought-provoking work, may be too 
optimistic in his belief that bonanza development was substantially 
achieved during this time, or even that the strategy itself was without 
serious internal flaw. In this context one might mention governments' 
lack of control over the international prices of their exports and also 
the difficulties of creating an efficient local manufacturing through state 
spending and subsidy. We will return to these more general themes later 
in the paper. 
This discussion will focus on the largest recent export-led development 
in Peru (with the possible exception of cocaine), namely the oil develop-
ment in the Amazon area. In one key respect, this oil development was 
quite different from the pattern of mining development described by 
Becker — it involved a sharp discontinuity from previous oil develop-
ments which were almost entirely confined to the coast and offshore. Its 
physical remoteness also differentiates it from the fishing 'bonanza' 
of the 1960s where substantial local linkages were possible.4 One would 
therefore expect oil development to be 'disadvantaged' in these two 
respects — the sharp discontinuity reducing the value of previous exper-
tise, and the geographical remoteness reducing the spin-off advantages to 
local industrial development. Both of these reduced the importance of 
local private capital vis-a-vis that of foreign companies and the Peruvian 
state. Even so, oil industry conditions were by no means wholly adverse 
from the Peruvian perspective; during the 1970s international conditions 
were more favourable to the producers of oil than they had ever been 
before and possibly than they will ever be again. 
If we are to consider how far the increasingly state-led 'bonanza 
development' attempted since 1968 differed from the earlier, more 
transnational-led variety, it becomes crucially important to make a 
thorough evaluation of the role of the state oil company, Petroperu. 
It seems reasonable to do this according to three criteria. The first is 
financial. Has the state company captured a financial surplus for poten-
tial re-investment which is significantly greater than might have been 
expected to result from the operations of private capital? The second is 
technological and is particularly important where the industry involves 
significant or major technical complexities. Has the state company 
significantly improved domestic technical capacity and thus reduced its 
dependence on foreign sources of technology? Finally, has the state 
company proved to be a national asset in negotiations with the private 
sector — particularly the foreign private sector? These three questions 
will be discussed in detail below. Before this, however, one must briefly 
give an account of what is subsequently to be analysed. 
The Selva Oil Development 
The Peruvian Amazon (Selva) has been known as a potential oil pro-
ducing area since the 1920s but the very high cost of exploration and 
development limited oil company interest; small finds were, however, 
made in 1938 and 1955. There had also been some unsuccessful explo-
ration; during the late 1950s Texaco drilled four dry holes and a con-
sortium led by Mobil drilled unsuccessfully in 1960-61 and in 1968. It has 
been estimated that prior to 1969 some 30 wells were sunk in the area 
to establish two small finds. Company interest was renewed, however, 
by exploration success in neighbouring countries — the Putumayo find 
in 1964 in Colombia and, even more significantly, the 1967 find in the 
Oriente in Ecuador. These exploration campaigns had become easier as a 
result of the development of the cargo-carrying helicopter, first used in 
this area during the 1960s. In 1968, oil company interest in the Peruvian 
Selva was growing markedly. 
For much of the century Peru has been a net exporter of oil although 
never on a large enough scale to enjoy a significant influence on world 
markets. At first the Peruvian economy derived rather little net benefit 
from these oil developments but, as an increasing proportion of its oil 
production came to be absorbed by the domestic market, price controls 
ensured what taxation apparently could not — a substantial increase in 
the returned value from oil. Until around 1960 Peru's oil production came 
overwhelmingly from onshore fields on the North Coast which had been 
discovered in the nineteenth or early twentieth centuries. After 1960 a 
limited amount of production became possible from the offshore. This 
did not prove sufficient to meet growing domestic demand and after 
1962 Peru switched from being a net exporter of oil to becoming a net 
importer. Although a small state company was set up in 1939, almost all 
oil production was in the hands of foreign companies. There had, during 
the 1950s, been some signs of exploration interest from local capitalists; 
these had, however, almost entirely withdrawn by 1968 with little to show 
for their efforts. 
In 1968-69 the main foreign company, the IPC, was expropriated 
by the incoming Velasco government under dramatic conditions which 
have been extensively analysed elsewhere.6 Following this, a new state 
enterprise, Petroperu, was set up and organised around the body of 
men who used to operate the IPC, only a few of whom had left after 
the expropriation. Initially the military government hoped that a state 
company, developing the same north coast fields, would be able to 
increase oil production substantially. This turned out not to be the 
case and, soon after the nationalisation, Petroperu began looking to 
the Amazon as the last unexplored frontier with oil potential in the 
country. 
Oil exploration in the Amazon, however, would be expensive, difficult 
and commercially dangerous. Exploration and development would be 
expensive enough but the economics of transportation provided an even 
more severe barrier. Very small oil output would suffice to supply the 
Amazon region and if substantial amounts of oil were discovered it 
would have to be transported by pipeline across the Andes — a venture 
which would certainly cost hundreds of millions of dollars.7 In 1970 
Petroperu estimated that a trans-Andean pipeline would cost at least 
$200m ; Petroperu's own net worth in 1971 was $73.3m. 
Petroperu therefore decided to mount its own exploration campaign 
(choosing the best area of the Selva for its venture) while throwing open 
the rest of the territory to foreign capital. This was brought in under a 
50-50 crude oil-sharing 'Peruvian Model' contract (which will be discussed 
in slightly more detail below). At first, things went almost embarrassingly 
well. Petroperu made a commercial oil discovery with its first well (in 
November 1971) and went on to find smaller quantities of oil with its next 
four wells — a tally (at the beginning of 1973) of five wells, five hits did 
promise a bonanza. Meanwhile, foreign companies showed themselves 
eager to enter Peru. By the middle of 1973 sixteen contracts had been 
signed, each covering lm hectares, with a variety of foreign companies 
which had clearly shown themselves unworried by the dramatic national-
isation of IPC. Occidental Petroleum, the first contractor and a company 
which had worked hard to get into Peru,8 had also made a number of oil 
discoveries with its early wells. By the end of 1973 it seemed certain that 
the Peruvian Amazon would be a commercial venture and the govern-
ment had already decided to construct the trans-Andean pipeline. 
The period 1974-77, however, saw a marked deterioration in these 
Amazonian prospects despite the sharp 1973-74 increase in world price 
levels. One major reason for this is that the geology itself proved dis-
appointing; many large geological structures, which promised oil in 
abundance, turned out to be empty although some smaller structures did 
indeed turn out to contain oil. An abundance was no longer in prospect 
and all of the private contractor companies, except Occidental, left the 
country without making an oil discovery (although as we shall see, 
geology was not the only reason for their going). Occidental did develop 
commercial operations which, it later calculated, had only become 
worthwhile as a consequence of the post-1973 world price increases.9 
Petroperu's own exploration luck had turned comparatively sour. It 
discovered only one new commercially exploitable field between 1973 and 
1977 while also encountering unexpected problems with its existing 
discoveries. 
This series of disappointments by no means turned the Amazon 
venture into a white elephant (as some contemporary critics suggested). 
In April 1976, when exploration success was at around its lowest ebb, the 
authoritative Andean Report provided a detailed survey of the Selva 
venture. This gave, as the most reliable figure available, De Golyer and 
McNaughton's estimate that 440 million barrels had thus far been proved 
to exist (180 million by Occidental and 260 million by Petroperu); some 
small amounts of oil were already being produced and transported locally 
by barge, but large-scale development would start when the trans-Andean 
pipeline was complete. At 1976 world price levels, and prevailing cost 
assumptions, Occidental's venture would just be profitable while Petro-
peru, taking into account its 50% share of Occidental's production, was 
comfortably placed. Peru would generate a modest export surplus which 
would at least enable it to pay the debts contracted for exploration and 
pipeline construction. Yet these conclusions, more optimistic than some 
others at that time, were a far cry from 1973 when the (military) head of 
Petroperu and the (also military) Minister of Mines and Energy were 
talking of established production of between 200,000 b/d and 500,000 b/d 
as if these figures were certainties. In 1974 General Fernandez Mal-
donado even announced Peru's eventual intention to join OPEC. 
Although it is true that many experienced geologists were disappointed 
with what they found in the Amazon, there appears also to have been a 
degree of wilful over-optimism on the part of the Velasco government. 
Certainly one of Petroperu's contracted senior geologists soon afterwards 
wrote: 
One reason that I left Petroperu was that I think the whole Peruvian oil play is 
extremely exaggerated for political reasons.10 
It appears that certain members of the Velasco government were con-
cerned to provide optimistic accounts of Amazon oil development in 
order to impress foreign bankers and secure the best possible terms for 
Peru's foreign borrowing. 
During the 1974-77 period policy tended to reflect both an increasing 
nationalism based on rising world oil prices and on the assumption that 
there were indeed vast oil reserves in the Selva and also an increasing 
lack of government coherence following Velasco's illness early in 1973 
and continuing infirmity. Attitudes toward foreign oil investment changed 
considerably. It is of course true that a contract expressed in terms of 
a division of crude oil is disproportionately favourable to the private 
company if the price of oil rises. It was thus beginning to appear that 
successful foreign investors might make excessive profits from their 
operations despite the care with which the original 'Peruvian model' 
contract had been constructed (this will be discussed again below). 
Consequently, in mid-1973 it was decided that no more contracts of this 
type would be signed; Petroperu's request to resume contract nego-
tiations in 1974 was turned down. Moreover, certain members of the 
government made clear their eventual intention to change some aspects 
of the contract unilaterally.11 Finally, informal administrative procedures 
were used to make it clear to some of the oil companies that their con-
tinued presence in the country was unwelcome. Beyond the limits of 
Peruvian action, but of interest to the US oil companies, were changes 
made in 1975 to US tax laws which made foreign exploration less attract-
ive. While it is likely that at least some of the oil companies would have 
been willing to overlook this change in climate had the Amazon area 
lived up to its geological promise, the combination of disappointing 
geology, a worsening tax regime and an unfavourable political environ-
ment proved too much in almost all cases. By 1977 Occidental was the 
only private oil company operating in the Peruvian Amazon. 
1974 was also the year in which serious work began on the trans-
Andean pipeline. The original decision to build a pipeline was taken at 
least provisionally as early as 1972 — a law dated 6 June 1972 declared its 
construction to be a national priority. It was in 1974, however, that 
financing was finally secured and the first construction contracts placed. 
During the same year the daily press was nationalised and two influential 
weekly magazines were closed down for criticising government policy; the 
next two years mark a period for which it is extremely difficult to secure 
information as to the progress of Petroperu or of the oil venture gener-
ally. Moreover the government was particularly sensitive to criticism 
relating to the pipeline construction. This appears to have been mainly 
the result of public opposition from the Lima Bar Association to a large 
fixed-interest loan from Japan whose terms included a provision for the 
international arbitration of disputes. 
From the material that is available, it appears that during this period 
Petroperu substantially lost control of a number of decisions affecting 
pipeline construction and that this contributed substantially to the costs of 
the enterprise. Thus, for example, the Peruvian Air Force was given a 
monopoly of helicopter transport within the Amazon oil development 
areas and unashamedly set tariffs at a level which would subsidise the 
very rapid expansion of the helicopter fleet.12 In any case, and for what-
ever precise reasons, the pipeline — when finally completed — ended up 
costing some $729m rather than the $550m or so widely estimated in mid-
1974. 
The construction of the pipeline involved the Peruvian government 
in a further set of negotiations with Occidental (described by one in-
side source as 'arduous and difficult')13 over transportation. Until then, 
Occidental had invested only in exploration activities; these were expen-
sive enough but did not involve the still larger sums required for oil 
development. (Occidental itself later stated that it had invested $70.7m 
up to the end of 1974). Apart from the main pipeline, it would also be 
necessary to build a feeder line to move oil from Occidental's fields to the 
main junction. This would cost around $160m. Occidental originally 
expressed willingness to build such a line, but the government refused 
to permit this (allegedly on grounds of national security) and instead 
offered to build the feeder line itself and to charge Occidental cost plus 
depreciation for throughput. Occidental happily agreed to this and Petro-
peru shouldered the extra financial burden. Agreement was finally 
reached in January 1976. 
Crisis and Recovery 
From 1977 onwards oil development moved into a new phase. Regarding 
national politics, there was a clear move to the Right; Velasco himself 
was overthrown in August 1975 and the last of the military Radicals 
resigned in June 1976.14 Rather than a sharp political swing, however, 
policy on oil moved gradually and not always securely in a more liberal 
direction until 1979 when (as we shall see below) serious renegotiations 
with Occidental began. Petroperu itself did not recover from the decline 
which had started around 1974; indeed it suffered further as the Peruvian 
economy as a whole went through severe recession between 1976 and 
1979. 
Petroperu's organisational and financial problems have been discussed 
elsewhere and need not be treated in detail here.15 It is, however, worth 
mentioning three factors which played an increasing part in limiting the 
contribution which Petroperu was able to make to the development 
of the Selva. The first of these was that oil product prices, which had 
remained largely frozen since 1959, were not increased until the middle 
of 1975 despite warnings from government technocrats, particularly 
after 1973, that low domestic prices were becoming increasingly onerous. 
After 1975 prices did increase rapidly in local currency terms but the 
impact was partly offset by some heavy devaluations of the Peruvian 
Sol. It was, however, agreed in 1973 that Petroperu would be com-
pensated for its domestic price subsidy (to the extent that this involved 
actual loss) by the Banco de la Nacion. Petroperu, therefore, continued 
to import oil (until mid-1977) which was marketed at a loss but, as the 
subsidy from the Banco de la Nacion was in practice paid late or not at 
all, covered its position by short-term borrowing on the international 
market. This both increased its debts and greatly confused its financial 
position.16 
Secondly, there was a legal problem with the 'Peruvian model' con-
tracts. In 1974 the Peruvian government ruled that Petroperu was liable 
for double taxes on the oil produced by contracting companies in such 
a way that it ended up paying over 100% of the income which it received 
(i.e. it paid the contracting company's taxes and then had to pay taxes 
again on the 50% oil share which it had itself received from the com-
pany). This problem was more difficult to resolve than appeared at first 
sight because the US companies operating in Peru (Belco which operated 
offshore, as well as Occidental) themselves had a difficult relationship 
with the US tax authorities; this relationship was crucially dependent on 
taxes notionally paid by the companies themselves but actually paid by 
Petroperu. This became a highly complex matter in which scope for 
confusion was endless; nor were matters helped by the government's 
fears that nationalists would criticise any change in taxation provisions 
which could be construed (however implausibly) as involving 'under 
the table' payments to the companies. A new oil tax law in 1977 which 
aimed to resolve the situation had the unintended effect of seriously 
compromising Belco Petroleum which protested energetically until the 
measure was withdrawn (the repeal then led to nationalist criticism of the 
government).17 
The final reason for Petroperu's problems was simple inefficiency. A 
series of reports for the government in 1976 and 1977 made it clear that 
the operating level of Petroperu had fallen substantially after around 
1974; this was blamed mainly on red tape and the creation of a 'civil 
service' rather than an enterprise mentality within the agency.18 It 
appears that despite these problems Petroperu was (until 1977) able to 
continue its Selva operations at a fairly high level at the price of an 
increasingly chaotic financial position and it indeed preferred to run up 
debt than to curtail its operations. From around the middle of 1978, 
however, Petroperu became largely unable to borrow (due to the national 
economic crisis) and the company had no choice but to begin a major 
reduction in its level of operations. Petroperu drilled eighteen exploration 
wells in 1976, fifteen in 1977, fourteen in 1978 and only two in 1979.19 
Meanwhile equipment needed for oil development, which would have 
increased Petroperu's Selva production from the actual 20,000 b/d (after 
July 1977) to a notionally possible 40,000 b/d, was held up by a shortage 
of cash. Even more seriously, wage controls imposed on the company as 
a part of the government's austerity measures after 1978 led to an outflow 
of technical specialists to countries such as Venezuela which were still 
recruiting. Several hundred departed in this way and the damage done to 
Petroperu was lasting; once they find lucrative employment elsewhere, 
such men rarely come back. 
While Petroperu was weakening, Occidental was becoming increasingly 
strong. When the other companies all withdrew, the government finally 
came to the conclusion that more foreign investment in the Selva would 
be necessary and in December 1975 Petroperu was again given the legal 
right to sign contracts with foreign companies. Early in 1976 it was clear 
that Petroperu was willing to negotiate seriously with any interested 
party.20 No companies came forward, however, and a formal re-opening 
of the Selva contract areas in 1977 did not alter this position. 
While Peru was seeking fresh foreign investment, it could not afford to 
antagonise Occidental for fear of discouraging the others. Occidental 
itself, well content with the final pipeline agreement (made in January 
1976), once more began expanding its investment in Peru; this rose to 
$137.6m at the end of 1976 and $201.9m at the end of 1977. In mid-1977 
Occidental discovered the only genuinely large field to have been found 
so far in the Peruvian Amazon — Capuhuari Sur, with an eventual 
production potential of around 65,000 b/d. Thus in July 1977 Occidental 
made the decision in principle to increase its investment in Peru and 
approached the government in September with a firm proposal. This was 
to take over a territory formerly explored by Union Oil in which heavy 
oil had been discovered but abandoned as uncommercial. Occidental 
believed that this heavy oil could be mixed with Occidental's own light oil 
and thus transported through pipeline; it hired Union's former explo-
ration manager and offered to undertake the work if it were offered 
especially favourable terms. Occidental also teamed up with Bridas, an 
Argentine company with military connections (especially useful given 
Peruvian-Argentine military links), to offer a cont act for secondary 
recovery on the Peruvian coast. After several months of indecisive 
negotiation, Armand Hammer, the President of Occidental, flew to Lima 
in March 1978 and, after talking to the President and Finance Minister, 
secured the signing of the contracts on April 4, 1978. 
In March 1978, Occidental began to send its own oil through the 
pipeline to the coast. Production began at 45,000 b/d and quickly built 
up to 80,000 b/d; later in the year Occidental added pumps to the spur 
pipeline to increase its output to 100,000 b/d. During 1978 Petroperu 
was producing some 28,000 b/d from its own fields and had completely 
stopped drilling for lack of funds.21 Occidental was still producing accord-
ing to the terms of the 'Peruvian model' contract agreed in 1971. Even 
though its exploration success was only moderate, Occidental was making 
heavy profits as a result of the higher world prices, which increased still 
further after the second 'oil shock' in 1979. According to an inside source, 
Occidental had by April 1980 'almost recovered its original investment' 
after just two years of oil production.22 There was, to be sure, some 
nationalist criticism of Occidental's position but the government — in 
serious financial difficulty and eager to attract fresh foreign investment 
into oil — was in no position to renegotiate seriously. 
In late 1978 the government did in fact make known privately its 
intention to renegotiate.23 Occidental first believed that the government 
would begin by negotiating with new foreign companies who were now 
starting to take a serious interest in Peru; following such new agreements, 
the same terms would then be applied to Occidental. However, the actual 
pattern of events was different. In May 1979 a team of international 
investment bankers was contracted to draw up an alternative on which 
renegotiation could be based. Once this had been reported, the govern-
ment in December 1979 legislated its intention to renegotiate directly 
with Occidental. After several months of negotiation, terms were not so 
much agreed as imposed on the company and signed at the end of April 
1980. 
These terms amounted to an attempt by the government to reduce 
company profitability to a small amount at the margin. It was accepted 
that this would be insufficient to encourage re-investment or to attract 
new companies to explore but the aim was instead to re-capitalise Petro-
peru from the extra revenue raised and keep the state company as the 
dominant operator in the Selva. According to the new terms, the crude 
oil split was maintained as before but profits taxes would, in addition, be 
levied upon the companies in respect of the 50% oil share which they 
received. These tax rates, levied at 68.55%, would still have left some 
profit for Occidental,24 but insufficient to persuade them to expand their 
investment. The government negotiators — economic nationalists — 
believed this to be a way of guaranteeing gradual nationalisation. 
Following the election of Belaunde to the Presidency in July 1980, 
policy moved back in a more liberal direction. The tax regime applied to 
the companies formally remained, but tax credits were offered for re-
investment in the oil industry up to a maximum of 40% of the pre-tax 
profit. This proved sufficient to attract investment from Superior and 
Royal Dutch/Shell, both of which signed contracts for Selva exploration 
during 1981. Occidental, meanwhile, stepped up its investment in Peru 
further and made two more small oil finds at Ceci and Jibarito. There 
was also a notable increase in foreign oil investment in the coastal and 
offshore areas which is beyond the scope of this discussion. Despite 
everything, however, the increase in foreign investment was less than the 
government had hoped. One reason for this was a downturn in the world 
oil market which became apparent in 1981 and became increasingly 
serious towards the end of 1982. This liberal oil policy met domestic 
opposition from within Congress and also from some military officers 
leading to procedural delays in the approval of certain contracts which 
were then aborted when some members of the consortia lost interest.25 
The Belaunde government did, however, make serious efforts to 
improve the performance of Petroperu. Legislation early in 1981 changed 
the legal status of the company to a Sociedad Anonima which meant that 
it became exempt from the wage controls applied to central government 
employees. Petroperu's financial position was also strengthened, largely 
with the aid of a $32.5m loan from the World Bank in 1980 (and a smaller 
loan from the IDB). Thus Petroperu was able to resume an exploration 
programme in the Selva and in late 1980 made a significant find in Nueva 
Esperanza. Despite some improvement, however, Petroperu continued 
to suffer from a lack of funds — one consequence of which was that 
the agency became particularly keen to develop any discoveries made 
even though this meant taking resources away from further exploration 
activity.26 In 1982 a further World Bank loan of $81.2m was made to 
Petroperu and the company underwent further internal re-organisation 
following a management report from A.D. Little. 
Meanwhile Selva oil production did not change markedly between 1979 
and 1982 (the 1983 figure will be somewhat reduced due to a break in the 
main pipeline resulting from flooding); official reserve figures have not 
changed markedly either (remaining at around 500m barrels) and there 
should be no problem maintaining production levels for several more 
years. Within the overall Selva production figure of around (or a little 
under) 130,000 b/d, Occidental has consistently produced around 100,000 
b/d and Petroperu a further 30,000 b/d or a little less. This suggests that 
rather more than 200m barrels have so far been produced from the area 
with a market value (allowing for the sharp price increases of 1979) 
approaching $5,000m. With the possible exception of the cocaine trade, 
this is certainly the largest single venture in the economic history of Peru. 
The Role of Petroperu: an evaluation 
It is time to return to a more general discussion of the role of Petro-
peru in this development, in terms of its financial, technological and 
negotiating performance. It is worth bearing in mind, however, that 
ex post evaluations depend upon contingencies which were not always 
foreseeable; in this case Petroperu was unlucky with the geology of the 
Amazon area but lucky with the international price. Yet it would also be 
wrong to ascribe everything to luck or to the unforeseen and unexpected. 
The Selva campaign does in many ways (apart from its intrinsic import-
ance) provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the effect of state enter-
prise upon an otherwise fairly standard form of activity in terms of Peru's 
economic history. 
Let us look first at the financial criterion. According to a survey 
reported in July 1980,27 Petroperu had proven Selva reserves at that time 
of some 185m barrels, having already produced around 25m barrels from 
the area. Since then at least one significant new find has been made, at 
Nueva Esperanza. Moreover, estimates of proven recoverable reserves 
almost always turn out to be too low. Petroperu's total oil discoveries to 
date could therefore be placed, very conservatively, at between 250 and 
300m barrels. Even at $25 a barrel, these would have a market value of 
around $7,000m. The AR28, with inside information, estimated that in its 
Selva operation Occidental spent $1.89 a barrel in running costs, not 
including depreciation, and a further $1.52 a barrel in transportation cost 
(i.e. for use of the pipeline); this latter figure fell to $1.17 in 1980. Thus, 
if Occidental had made Petroperu's discoveries (250 to 300m barrels) but 
with its own costs, it would have generated a surplus (after running and 
transportation costs, but before taxation and accumulated depreciation 
were taken into account) of over $20 a barrel. Setting Petroperu's dis-
coveries against Occidental's running costs and its accumulated total 
investment in Peru — not just in the Selva — of some $500m (to end 
1980), one would have a surplus of around $5,000m without discounting 
for time preference. Only an enormous discount rate could turn this 
into anything but a hugely profitable venture. Even if we make ample 
allowance for Petroperu's lower operating efficiency, its non-pipeline 
investment in the Selva must still have been heavily profitable. 
Would it have been more profitable still for Petroperu to have given 
way to a private concern which could have been taxed on its production? 
There seems no reason to believe that a private company would have 
discovered much more oil than Petroperu did (many private companies 
pulled out of the Selva without a commercial discovery). It is, indeed, 
unclear whether a large foreign operator or consortium (the only kind 
that could have been expected to invest in these conditions) would have 
had the patience to persevere with a difficult block capable of producing, 
at best, only around 40,000 b/d. Prior to the 1979 oil price increases this 
would have seemed, at best, only a marginal venture. Conversely, a 
foreign operator would not have been hit, as Petroperu was in 1978 and 
1979, by a severe cash squeeze and would therefore have been able to 
produce rather more oil rather more quickly. 
Yet foreign investment is not cheap. In 1980, following the renego-
tiation of the Peruvian model contract, Occidental was expected to make 
around $134m profit in 1980 (on its entire Peruvian operation) on an 
accumulated capital investment of around $500m (at end 1980) — this 
rate of return, just under 27%, without allowing anything for previous 
years' amortisation/depreciation, was judged inadequate if the company 
was going to continue investing in Peru.29 In the event, Occidental 
repatriated $378m during that year, 30 around $10.35 per barrel pro-
duced. If we remember that Occidental was spending $3.52 per barrel in 
running cost (not including depreciation), Petroperu would have had 
to be nearly three times more inefficient than Occidental in order to 
contribute less to the Peruvian treasury (and this assumes that 'inefficient' 
local spending by Petroperu confers no benefit at all on Peru). When one 
bears in mind that a high proportion of both Occidental's and Petroperu's 
budget consists of payment to specialist contracting companies and that 
nearly half of Occidental's running cost involves payment to Petroperu 
for pipeline charges (both of which would have afforded a multinational 
no margin over a state company), these figures are eloquent indeed. Even 
if we assume that Petroperu's genuinely variable running costs (which 
largely involve keeping teams in the Selva in order to repair breakdowns) 
and original capital costs (and therefore depreciation) were four or five 
times those of an efficient private concern, it would still have generated 
more public income than a private operator operating Petroperu's block, 
even before taking into account the effect of Belaunde's tax credits which 
came into effect in January 1981. 
Petroperu's decision to build the pipeline, however, is not so clear 
cut. On the basis of the discoveries that were actually made, it was 
possible to set a tariff which would pay for the pipeline without upsetting 
the economics of exploration and development. At around $1.50 per 
barrel, 130,000 b/d of throughput yields around $70m per annum. The 
original cost of the pipeline was $579.3m in terms of foreign debt31 plus 
a significant local content coming to $729m in total32 — this debt was 
substantially fixed interest, contracted at the single-figure rates normal in 
1974 so that $70m p.a. would at least service the foreign debt and pay for 
the cost of pumping. The $180m investment carried out by Petroperu to 
link Occidental's fields to the main pipeline was to be amortised by 
Occidental over a ten-year period. 
Yet the crucial point here is that the financial viability of the pipeline 
has depended on continuing operation by Occidental. There can be no 
doubt that Petroperu's discoveries, on their own, would not have justified 
construction of the pipeline; without the pipeline, moreover, Petroperu 
would have been restricted to a very limited degree of local production 
from the Selva — perhaps 10-15,000 b/d. Nor is it the case that Petroperu 
could simply have taken over Occidental's territory and produced the oil. 
Petroperu was constrained by financial and technical limitations and not 
by any shortage of territory to explore. Even after Occidental had made 
its discoveries, this position did not change decisively. Rose suggests that 
in early 1980 
a possible expropriation of Occidental was discarded as unfeasible by the 
government when Petroperu informed it that they lacked the necessary 
technicians to run the Occidental oilfields.33 
The conclusion here, then, is that successful operation by Occidental (or, 
under different circumstances, by a different private company) was 
essential to the financial viability of Petroperu's investment and, indeed, 
to the whole Selva programme. 
With hindsight, it would seem that Peruvian oil policy with respect to 
Selva development was roughly correct in outline (in the sense that it 
involved both state and private investment) although undoubtedly open 
to criticism on a range of fairly important secondary issues. Would it not 
have been better for Petroperu to have allowed Occidental to build its 
own spur line in 1976-78? A major project with almost no externalities 
which would self-finance over a ten-year period could surely not have 
been at the top of Peruvian developmental priorities in the mid-1970s. 
It may be, of course, that had the Peruvian government guaranteed the 
loan — as Occidental would have insisted — its own borrowing capacities 
would have been compromised in the same way, but this is by no means 
clear. Could Peru have got Occidental to build the whole trans-Andean 
pipeline? This seems unlikely and it also would have deprived Petroperu 
of a possible bargaining counter against Occidental — but not one that 
could in the event be used to much effect (on which see below). In any 
case, military and strategic considerations would surely have ruled out 
such an option for a Peruvian military regime, even though it might have 
released hundreds of millions of dollars for use elsewhere. 
The second criterion was technological. Given that the oil exploration 
project, and Petroperu's participation within it, were both substantially 
profitable in the narrow financial sense, it is hard to imagine how the 
technological balance could actually be negative. Petroperu has undoubt-
edly learned a good deal from its Selva operations. It deliberately set out 
to learn as much as it could from its private sector partners (all operating 
companies were obliged under their contracts to provide Petroperu with 
full geological data for their blocks). Petroperu in 1981 attempted unsuc-
cessfully to persuade Superior Oil to accept Petroperu as minority partner 
in its venture, and in the same year came close to a joint-venture agree-
ment with a consortium led by Hispanoil, although this was also aborted 
when Hispanoil withdrew. There is, however, undoubtedly a negative 
side to Petroperu's technological performance as well. 
Petroperu was always a little thin with regard to top technical staff.34 It 
had taken over a well-run organisation from IPC — but IPC's activities 
had been concentrated in the far easier coastal area of Peru and there had 
been no serious history of Selva exploration. The Selva was, moreover, 
difficult by world standards; there are few harder natural terrains for oil 
exploration and development than Amazonian jungle and many of the 
private companies were unpleasantly surprised by the intensity of the 
problems encountered. What was worse for Petroperu was that the state 
company was unable to keep all of its own top technical staff. A number 
left in 1972 and 1973 to go to work with foreign oil companies (leading 
to considerable mistrust on the part of the Peruvian nationalists for 
those who remained); even more left in the late 1970s to go and work in 
Venezuela or in the domestic private sector due to salary restrictions and 
the generally low morale prevailing within the state company. Although, 
after the Peruvian economy recovered in 1979-80, successive Peruvian 
governments did take active measures to strengthen the state company, it 
did not prove easy to make good the damage already done. In November 
1981 the Andean Report commented that 
the policy with oil exploration and production seems to be to put Petroperu 
more or less on hold partly because of local shortage of the risk capital needed 
to prove and develop new reserves and partly because Petroperu is so run down 
in terms of technical and managerial capacity that the government does not 
think it practical to spend its own money on building the company back up. 
One of the consequences of this was that in 1981 Petroperu was able to 
spend only $102.6m of a $215m exploration and development budget. 
The implications of this situation are worth discussing. It has often 
been pointed out by Left-wing critics of state companies (and of foreign 
transnationals) that almost every aspect of oil industry activity can 
be, and frequently is, contracted out to specialist companies. While this 
is true, the implication sometimes drawn — that technical expertise 
is relatively unimportant in the oil industry — is misleading. This is 
partly because sub-contracting, even if easy, is not necessarily cheap. The 
main point, however, is that the overall planning of a project involves 
contracting the right functions to the right people and co-ordinating a 
number of stages (making sure that all necessary inputs arrive in time, 
that drilling sites are selected when drilling rigs become available, that 
expertise is quickly on hand when there is a mechanical breakdown, etc.) 
in a way that requires a high level of managerial and technical talent. A 
state oil company cannot be run efficiently without this. 
Moreover, while certain kinds of oil technology can be taught formally, 
there is in practice no real substitute for experience. (Not that there is a 
substitute for formal training either). It would be wrong to be dogmatic 
about particular cases, but certain highly sensitive jobs within the industry 
can be done well only after a decade or more of serious experience. For 
this reason, top technicians who leave an industry cannot simply be 
replaced by young recently-trained graduates. A brain drain can have a 
damaging effect for many years — YPF in Argentina suffered such a 
brain drain under Peron and has perhaps never fully recovered35 — and 
there are indications that Petroperu has also suffered badly. It is to be 
hoped that the state company will not suffer as badly as YPF and there 
are already some encouraging signs of improvement since 1978-79 (a 
resumption of Selva drilling with some success, some increase in pro-
duction from earlier discoveries, a better financial structure) but one 
should not underestimate the vulnerability of state companies to a major 
haemorrhage of top technicians. 
There were always severe technical limits to the extent to which Petro-
peru could explore and develop the Selva. In 1970 Petroperu was, by any 
international standard, a very small company and the Peruvian Selva was 
one of the most difficult terrains in the world. From this point of view, as 
well as from the purely financial, it is not easy to see how the Amazon 
venture could have been a success without the participation of at least 
one very active foreign company. But this intensified dangers of a brain 
drain. 
Another general point should also be made here. Peru's economic 
history has been one of export-led growth generated for the most part 
by the incremental incorporation of new resources (mines, oil wells, 
agricultural properties) into world markets. All other things being equal, 
one would expect the most accessible resources to be developed first. 
Then either because of rising world prices, changing world tastes or 
improving international technology, the less accessible resources would 
be progressively brought in. Of course all other things are not always 
equal, and potential resources often are left undeveloped due to oligo-
polistic world strategies, political difficulties of some kind, or sheer 
ignorance of what resources are available. Even so, the last project to be 
brought in is, generally speaking, the marginal project — either because 
of the very heavy development costs involved (true of many Peruvian 
mining ventures) or because of the difficult technology, or (as in the case 
of Selva oil) due to a combination of the two. Certainly projects which 
are marginal at one time may turn out later to be highly profitable — 
Arabian oil was once regarded as marginal — but one cannot auto-
matically expect them to provide a bonanza in Becker's sense (i.e., to 
generate a substantial surplus to be distributed to other sectors of the 
economy). Moreover, Peruvian state enterprises, if committed to pursu-
ing such a strategy, are likely to be thrown into the deep end with a 
vengeance if the new project involves a sharp discontinuity with what 
has gone before. Any technical or management failures could easily 
turn a marginally profitable venture into an outright and maybe heavy 
loss-maker. Thus, for Peru after 1968 there remained only the Selva 
as a potentially important source of oil production (just as there only 
remained the formidably difficult and expensive irrigation projects and 
the relatively low grade and high cost mineral developments); the easier 
prospects had been exhausted during the previous hundred years. Yet if 
development of the Peruvian Amazon proved (as it did) to be a highly 
difficult task for large and experienced international companies with 
vastly greater human and financial resources than those of Petroperu 
(or the whole Peruvian government for that matter); then one can hardly 
expect Petroperu to have found the task easy. If it had been easier, 
private companies would in all probability have developed the area 
during previous decades. (The Mexican case provides a revealing con-
trast. Here foreign companies were forbidden to explore after 1938 — 
few had actually done so since 1925 — leaving geological prospects 
available which were within reach of Pemex during the 1970s). 
Finally, and even allowing for these difficulties, the military govern-
ment must take some of the blame for allowing Petroperu to deteriorate. 
One can, perhaps, feel some sympathy for their position. The Velasco 
government was undoubtedly radical — its own members described it as 
'Revolutionary' — and it nationalised IPC as a blow against 'imperialism' 
in general and the USA in particular. Yet the military regime found itself 
compelled to work with men who had been trained by, and worked 
happily under, a US top management and who, in very many cases, 
had little or no sympathy for the aims of the 'Revolution'. Moreover, 
Petroperu in 1970-71 produced and negotiated a contract for foreign 
investors which later appeared much too favourable to the latter and 
came under strong nationalist criticism. To cap it all, some of the best 
technicians in the company eagerly seized jobs with the foreign com-
panies which they had just brought back into the country. Even apart 
from this, officials in the Mines and Planning Ministries frequently 
complained that Petroperu executives behaved in an arrogant fashion and 
paid very little attention to their political seniors. (A Petroperu executive, 
in contrast, described the National Planning Institute as being 'full of 
young graduates who dream').36 There can be no doubt that Petroperu 
in its early days went to considerable lengths to avoid even that degree 
of control and accountability that almost any government would have 
considered reasonable.37 
For these reasons, therefore, Petroperu's nationalist opponents in 
the government went to considerable lengths to try to control the com-
pany by various measures which Petroperu executives regarded as red 
tape or worse. Some of the most senior ex-IPC executives were also 
unhappy with a top layer of military senior managers (at times, as many 
as five) who had no previous experience of the oil industry (or of any 
kind of commercial concern) and whom one well placed observer des-
cribed as being 'not particularly easy to work for'.38 Later the pol-
itical climate changed and, after 1975, the military regime increasingly 
became willing to promote civilians to top management positions. But 
in late 1976 economic crisis struck and Petroperu came to suffer the 
consequences — a sharp reduction in real wages and, in 1978 and 1979, 
an almost complete freeze on fresh investment even though at that 
time quite small amounts of money could have produced a significant 
increase in output. Again with hindsight one might say that the political 
authorities — besieged as they undoubtedly were by economic claims 
from all sides and uncertain of their own long-term survival — did too 
little to protect Petroperu from the recession. Certainly there was a long 
period of indecision and throughout the crisis the imperatives of short-
term survival took precedence over any long-term economic planning. 
The political economy of crisis management and its relation to Peru 
deserves more attention than it can be given here, but studies of this have 
highlighted the difficulty of avoiding long-term structural damage to the 
economy from austerity measures.39 
Ultimately these various problems with Petroperu raise a more general 
question about any project of nationalist reform in Latin America (many 
of them also applied to Peronist Argentina and Goulart's Brazil). A 
reform project will depend heavily on state enterprise because foreign 
companies will be put under direct political pressure and local capital 
will tend to side with 'foreign interests and the oligarchy' rather than 
supporting reform (some nationalist-reformists have been surprised and 
disappointed by such behaviour although it is difficult to see why).40 Yet 
the top managers and technical specialists of the state enterprise may 
sometimes secretly (and sometimes not so secretly) sympathise with the 
conservative groups under attack. After all, such men have an inter-
national market value, which is their ultimate political protection, and 
they move in the same circles and talk in the same terms as their private 
sector counterparts. This is not to say that they will inevitably be active 
opponents of reformist-nationalist governments but there is likely to 
be a good deal of mutual (and sometimes justified) suspicion between 
such governments and state enterprise managements. Yet a reformist-
nationalist government cannot ultimately do without a class of technicians 
and managers — and an attempt to run state companies through narrowly 
political appointments or by tightening bureaucratic controls is likely to 
end in disaster. Ironically, the country which has developed probably the 
most efficient state-capitalist system in Latin America in recent years — 
namely Brazil — is rhetorically very strongly laissez-faire. This rhetoric 
may be necessary to reassure the state elite as much as the private sector. 
The third criterion to be discussed here relates to the impact of a state 
company on bargaining between the host government and multinationals. 
In the Peruvian case an interesting if rather unexpected pattern appears. 
The first occasion on which Petroperu asserted itself was in 1969-71 when 
it opposed the Mines and Energy Ministry's draft oil law, won the right to 
prepare its own contracts, undertook negotiations with Occidental and 
won government approval (against some opposition) for the 'Peruvian 
model' contract.41 It subsequently signed another fifteen contracts with 
foreign companies for Amazon oil exploration. Such criticisms as were 
made of the 'Peruvian model' contracts came from a nationalist direction 
but there was general recognition within the military government that 
some foreign investment in the region would be necessary if the Amazon 
oil industry was to be developed. Petroperu's influence lay in giving shape 
to this recognition and turning it into actual arrangements with foreign 
companies. Petroperu's main motive was to turn its own limited effort in 
the region into a vast international venture which would guarantee a 
substantial role to the state company. Certainly the effect was to bring in 
more foreign investment, more quickly, than would otherwise have been 
the case. 
After the 'Peruvian model' contracts fell into near disgrace from the 
end of 1973, Petroperu itself largely lost control of negotiations with 
foreign companies and never really regained it. After this it was the 
existence and economic position of the state company which influenced 
events more than the expressed wishes of the state company managers 
themselves. 
The first real occasion on which Petroperu's position became important 
was in 1974 when negotiations began over the tariff for the trans-Andean 
pipeline. Petroperu, seriously embarrassed by criticism that it had offered 
too much to the companies in the 'Peruvian model' contracts, sought to 
recoup by setting an artificially high tariff. Its first request was for a $6.80 
a barrel throughput fee,42 at this time more than 50% of the world price. 
It is likely that this prospect helped discourage the various other foreign 
companies which pulled out in 1975-76 without establishing any com-
mercial discoveries. Occidental, meanwhile, in the words of a former 
executive of the company, 
was going slow on exploration and drilling while it tried to finalise a pipeline 
and crude oil sales contract with Petroperu.43 
The Peruvian government, and Petroperu, clearly failed in their efforts to 
use the pipeline as a bargaining counter against Occidental and the other 
private companies. Occidental later accepted a throughput charge which 
would help cover the cost of the pipeline but no more. 
One reason for this failure was that Occidental had not by then invest-
ed heavily enough in its exploration venture — the more expensive 
development phase only began when agreement with Petroperu was 
reached. Even more fundamental was the fact that Petroperu, once 
committed to building the trans-Andean pipeline, needed Occidental's 
petroleum (or at least its own 50% share of this petroleum) very badly. 
As we have seen, the financial viability of Petroperu's whole venture 
depended upon Occidental's oil discoveries which Petroperu itself was in 
no position to take over and run. Occidental merely had to wait for the 
financial pressure on Petroperu to begin to tell before being in a position, 
if not exactly to name its own price, then at least to dampen down Petro-
peru's attempts to alter the 'Peruvian model' contracts in its favour. 
In this case, therefore, Petroperu's own operational requirements 
inhibited it from driving a harder bargain with Occidental. (A harder 
bargain, incidentally, does not necessarily mean a better one as the 
Peruvian economy as a whole was at this time very dependent on Occi-
dental's continued, and indeed expanded, operations in the country.) Just 
as in 1971-73, Petroperu needed foreign investment to complement its 
own and could not afford to wait too long in order to try to improve the 
terms. 
Serious renegotiation with Occidental did take place during 1979 and 
1980. By the end of 1979 Occidental had largely amortised its original 
investment (due to the high profits made in 1978 and 1979) and was 
therefore willing to be more flexible as to its future operation in Peru. 
The first renegotiation was headed by Silva Ruete and a group of nation-
alist economists in the Finance Ministry rather than by Petroperu itself. 
The second renegotiation was led by Kuczynski at the Mines Ministry. 
By this time, Petroperu had begun to recover from the near-bankruptcy 
which had complicated both its operations and its relations with the 
government during 1978-79 and it expressed an interest in joint-venture 
arrangements with the foreign companies. Such an arrangement was 
made with respect to the Occidental/Bridas secondary recovery pro-
gramme on the coast,44 according to which the foreign companies agreed 
to train Petroperu staff. After 1980, as we have seen, Petroperu made 
several unsuccessful efforts to negotiate joint ventures for Selva 
operations. 
When one considers the role of Petroperu in state-foreign company 
relations, then, the result is rather surprising. There were some important 
negotiations in which the state company did not play a role, but where 
it was active it was less rather than more nationalist than the rest of 
the government. Yet where it did not play an active role in negotiations 
(as in 1980) its needs and requirements also played a part in softening 
the government's position; thus in 1980 Petroperu advised the Finance 
Ministry that it could not take over Occidental's fields and its joint-
venture agreement in the same year provided a further justification for 
the presence of the foreign companies in Peru. 
Nationalist critics of the company would (indeed did) attribute this 
moderation to the 'IPC heritage' among Petroperu executives but this 
explanation seems inadequate to explain the pipeline negotiations and 
the 1980 renegotiations in which Petroperu appears not to have played 
a direct part. It seems that the question is more structural. Petroperu's 
main interest was in elaborating its own programme of oil development 
and acquiring the necessary technical and financial resources in order 
to do this. Foreign companies could contribute by making both kinds 
of resource available to the state company — more exploration work 
would add to knowledge about the industry, and more oil production 
would both increase the share given to Petroperu and protect the heavy 
investment in the pipeline. This situation contrasts sharply with that 
prevailing before 1968 when all of the available onshore oil producing 
territory seemed to have been discovered and developed by private 
companies leaving little scope for the further expansion of the state 
enterprise; under pre-1968 conditions, EPF technicians tended to be 
nationalist whereas the Selva was evidently big enough for both Petro-
peru and foreign companies.45 
In Conclusion 
It seems clear that Petroperu's participation in the Amazon oil explo-
ration did substantially change the character of the venture from the 
perspective of the Peruvian state and thus did something to confirm 
Shane Hunt's prognosis that 
The creation of Peruvian enterprises and Peruvian leadership within the 
national economy...provides the most severe challenge that Peru has faced this 
century. Having constructed a network of state enterprises destined to control 
the commanding heights of the economy, Peruvians will become obliged to 
manage, to administer, and to perform entrepreneurial functions as never 
before. The benefits to be obtained from successfully meeting this challenge are 
the greatest of all. It involves nothing less than changing a nation's character in 
a way that can bring development out of underdevelopment.46 
Yet the effect of this change was by no means as one-dimensionally 
beneficial as earlier optimistic forecasters tended to suggest. Thus, 
despite some undoubted recent improvement in its technological and 
financial capacity, Petroperu soon found itself playing a relatively junior 
role in the exploration and development effort, with the viability of its 
own efforts being conditional on Occidental's continuing satisfaction with 
operating conditions in Peru. 
It seems certain that Petroperu did secure a positive social return from 
its Amazon campaign by any reasonable measurement. The rising world 
price of oil more than offset the disappointments of Peruvian geology and 
ensured that Petroperu's oil discoveries, very limited by world standards, 
were more than enough to finance their heavy development cost. It is 
also highly probable that the profit rate required by a foreign company 
operating in this area would have more than offset any greater efficiency 
that such a company might have brought to bear. 
There is, however, one way in which Petroperu did not increase re-
turned value in relation to total investment — namely, in its negotiations 
with foreign companies. Its early negotiations were concerned, above all, 
with the speed at which substantial foreign investment could be attracted 
to supplement Petroperu's own exploration. Subsequently Petroperu's 
heavy fixed investments in the area - above all in the pipeline - ensured 
that it could not afford any cutbacks in Occidental's own production and 
could not therefore afford to drive too hard a bargain. Some bargaining 
theorists have suggested that a state company operating in an area 
increases the power of a host government because it creates a credible 
threat to nationalise. Yet Petroperu could never credibly threaten to 
nationalise Occidental — its limited technical capacity was more than 
fully extended as it was and its own desire to expand further in its own 
area ensured that it would continue to lack the spare technical/financial 
capacity to take over Occidental. 
There may have been something in nationalist criticism of Petroperu's 
lack of hostility towards foreign investment. It is perhaps a general truth 
in almost any country that two technical oil specialists, one of whom 
works for a state company, will have more in common than two state 
employees, one of whom is an oil specialist. The corollary of this is that 
reformist-nationalist governments may well be forced to rely for their 
economic success upon state enterprises whose technostructures are 
unsympathetic to the aims of government policy. Yet attempts to meet 
this situation by the imposition of clumsy bureaucratic controls can only 
make a difficult situation worse. Furthermore, it is by no means clear 
that Petroperu's reluctance to confront private companies stemmed 
mainly from a 'political false consciousness'. On the contrary, Petroperu 
executives were surely motivated by a desire to strengthen the basis of the 
whole Amazonian venture which they would have seen, from within their 
own corporate perspective, as meeting Peru's national interest. 
Critics have generally seen three, possibly four, mistakes in the way 
in which the Amazon oil venture was handled. Briefly these were the 
government's early over-confidence and the development of a 'Klondike' 
mentality, its failure to prevent (and in some respects its complicity 
in) the financial and technical deterioration of Petroperu, its consistent 
policy towards foreign investment and, perhaps most fundamentally, 
the over-commitment of resources to a capital-intensive modern sector 
project whose direct benefits to Peruvians were, at best, indirect and long 
term. 
It is evident that the Velasco regime did quickly become over-confident 
after the first few oil discoveries in Peru.47 This over-confidence was also, 
it is true, shared by some of the private oil companies and international 
bankers (some of whom will, it seems, believe anything) and was in any 
case genuinely based on some attractive-looking, though in the event 
highly deceptive, geology. It is harder to specify exactly what impact this 
over-confidence actually had on government policy.48 It may well have 
contributed to the government's willingness to spend heavily on subsidies, 
often to the not-particularly-poor, and to allow its financial position to 
deteriorate markedly in the years after 1973. Yet the allure of foreign 
borrowing, and the government's own quest for popular support, may 
have led to similar results in any case. Nor can one state with confidence 
that bankers would not have lent to an oil-less Peru — particularly when 
one considers the many dubious loans made to a whole variety of Latin 
American governments during the past decade. 
Even so, the early over-optimism about oil cannot have helped the 
voices of prudence within the Peruvian government. Moreover, one of 
the earliest super-optimists was the head of Petroperu General Fernandez 
Baca, who in April 1972 estimated that Petroperu would produce 200,000 
b/d by 1976 and 500,000 b/d by 1980. It is true that Fernandez Baca 
was by no means the only figure to have made some quite unrealistic 
estimates of future production but, had Petroperu been determinedly 
cautious, it would have been much more difficult for other members of 
the government to make wild statements. Yet Petroperu's geologists were 
by no means over-optimistic in this way; in March 1974 Zuninga, the 
head of Petroperu's exploration team, personally told the author that 
Petroperu could guarantee Selva production of no more than 38,000 b/d 
(and even that proved too high). 
It was, of course, a heady experience for a newly established state 
company, brought into existence in dramatic emotional terms following 
the removal of IPC, to go on to explore in the Selva and find oil with 
its first three wells. Even apart from this, there do seem to be some 
systematic factors behind the over-optimism of state companies. Petro-
peru's dwelling on its exploration success could be seen as an assertion 
within the government of its own role, and thus of its importance and 
priority claim on resources. A more cautious response might have led to 
reductions in its budget and, still worse, to greater delay and scrutiny 
of its investment plans. Optimistic forecasts by state companies are part 
of the stock-in-trade of intra-government bargaining over the use of 
resources. Against this, foreign companies tend to be, if anything, over-
cautious. A stress on the difficulties rather than the advantages of their 
operations both makes nationalisation less likely (since there seems to be 
less to nationalise) and may also discourage competitors from exploring 
for oil in the vicinity. (A private oil company which predicted vast 
reserves in an area and finally produced no more than around 30,000 b/d 
would also be subjected to a certain amount of ridicule within oil industry 
circles and to unfavourable comment from city editors and shareholders). 
It is perhaps a mark of the general inexperience of the Velasco govern-
ment in dealing with state enterprise (there having been very little such 
enterprise prior to 1968) that these claims were made so readily and 
amplified so ambitiously, although it must be said that the 'good news' of 
a Klondike oil boom has been presented, spread and widely believed in 
many other environments and at many other times. Moreover Petroperu 
has since 1976 influenced government policy in the direction of caution on 
a variety of oil related issues. After its original mistake, Petroperu may 
have influenced government policy for the better by making available to 
policy-makers first-hand experience of actual operating conditions in the 
Selva and thus dampening down naive over-optimism. 
A second mistake frequently cited was the way in which the military 
government allowed the financial and technical position of Petroperu 
to deteriorate after 1974 (with some recovery after 1980). This, too, 
seems largely indefensible although one must bear in mind the newness 
of large-scale public enterprise as a serious economic force in Peru and 
the difficulty of coping with it. The impact of policy-making errors of 
this kind is always hard to quantify, but the loss to Peru was undoubtedly 
substantial. The policy of low gasoline prices - pursued until mid-1975 -
added several hundred million dollars to Peru's foreign indebtedness 
and did nothing either to redistribute income in a positive direction 
or to improve Peru's capital stock. Borrowing (particularly at high 
international interest rates) in order to subsidise short-run consump-
tion is the direct opposite of a development strategy since it involves 
sacrificing the future in the interests of the present. Similarly, cutting 
back on Petroperu's investment in mid-1978 almost certainly deprived 
the state company of around 10,000 b/d of oil production in the short 
run — around $100m p.a. in lost exports at 1979-80 prices. This amount-
ed to some 3% of total exports and probably — given the impact of 
austerity measures then in force in order to strengthen the balance of 
payments — at least 2% p.a. of GNP. The long-term loss resulting from 
the emigration of technical staff will certainly be much greater than 
this. 
During this period Petroperu's experiences in many ways reflected 
those of the public sector as a whole. While unfavourable international 
trends played an undoubted part, a major contributory factor to the 
1976-79 recession in Peru was the wholly unsatisfactory financial position 
of the public sector; some writers have attributed the economic failures of 
the Velasco government mainly to this.49 Some of the structural charac-
teristics of public enterprise played a role here as well. It is, for example, 
hard to see how a foreign company could have been expected to sell oil 
products on the open market at a heavy loss, at least without receiving a 
subsidy which would have led to outcry from economic nationalists (and 
which would actually have had to be paid). Yet a state company could be 
made to sell at a loss and to borrow internationally in order to finance its 
losses. Such a policy, apart from seriously misallocating resources and 
excessively boosting current consumption, had the further effect of 
disguising the magnitude of Peru's economic problems until later than 
would otherwise have been the case — making the corrective austerity 
measures harder still. This is because the role played by borrowing (in 
Peru as often elsewhere) in subsidising consumption during the 1970s was 
somewhat disguised by the role of state enterprise in both subsidising 
consumption and carrying out investment. The Investment' role was 
stressed to foreign bankers while subsidies took up an increasing part of 
state enterprises' actual revenues. 
When austerity did come to Peru, state companies suffered dispro-
portionately.50 This is largely because of the inherent difficulties of 
stabilisation policy in Peru.51 Essentially the problem is that there are 
very few things that can be cut which do not threaten mass impoverish-
ment, political instability or heavy unemployment — or, indeed, a com-
bination of all three. The Morales Bermudez government on the whole 
chose to play it safe and protect such 'politically necessary' items as 
military spending and public sector employment at the price of a serious 
deterioration in living standards generally and a sharp cutback in state 
investment. One certainly appreciates the difficulties here but the govern-
ment may well have underestimated the long-term impact of some of its 
investment cut-backs and, even more so, of the 'brain drain' that resulted 
from its across-the-board policy on wages. There is, it is true, some 
evidence that the state mining companies did not suffer from a 'brain 
drain' as seriously as did Petroperu. Becker finds that neither Mineroperu 
nor Centromin lost senior staff on a particularly significant scale during 
this period.52 It is not immediately obvious why this should be so, al-
though two possible explanations spring to mind. It may be that the Selva 
oil development, being less traditionally a part of the Peruvian economy 
than the various mining ventures undertaken after 1968, attracted men 
who were less emotionally committed to Peru and less willing to stay 
when times were hard. Alternatively (or perhaps as another partial 
explanation), the oil industry was simply more favourable to international 
job seekers during this period than was mining; oil was booming, mining 
was in recession. In any case, it remains true that state enterprises tend to 
invest too heavily in good times and suffer with disproportionate severity 
when there are cutbacks to be made. 
The third criticism of oil policy during this period has concerned its 
inconsistency towards foreign companies — or, perhaps more accurately, 
criticism has come at different times from nationalists and also from those 
who were keen to see more foreign investment lured into the Selva. 
Critics of the latter kind would mention, above all, the government's 
unwelcoming attitude toward foreign companies in 1974 and 1975; having 
been given the opportunity of getting the whole Selva properly explored, 
the critics argue, the regime then threw it away and instead became 
unnecessarily dependent on Occidental. Nationalist critics would men-
tion, above all, the delay in renegotiating the 'Peruvian model' contracts 
with Occidental and Belaunde's offer of tax credits to attract foreign 
companies back.53 
Without going into a blow-by-blow account of events,54 it is worth 
noting that the ability of a country such as Peru to control foreign invest-
ment (except within very broad outlines) can easily be exaggerated. The 
'Peruvian model' contracts appeared to work because at least some of the 
companies anticipated higher world prices and thus higher profits for 
themselves than did Peru. If any of the foreign oil companies operating 
in the central or southern Selva had found commercial quantities of oil 
they would have sought cast-iron guarantees before undertaking serious 
development. As far as the northern Selva was concerned, there seems to 
be some plausibility in the nationalists' argument that this area could be 
satisfactorily explored over a longer period by Petroperu and Occidental 
without bringing in a whole army of foreign companies. (The recent 
exploration by Superior in the northern Selva and by Royal Dutch/Shell 
in the central-southern Selva may alter this pattern of an Occidental/ 
Petroperu duo, but at present this seems unlikely). Thus, the oil boom 
conditions of 1973-74 were both unnecessary for Peru and - in any case -
unlikely to last. 
Conversely, since Petroperu could not, as we have seen, credibly 
threaten to expropriate Occidental — except, perhaps, as a semi-suicidal 
gesture under sufficient provocation — there were limits to its bargaining 
power. Occidental's main concern was to get back its initial investment 
in Peru as quickly as possible — in the event this took just over two 
years. After that it could either passively accept a high tax rate while 
cutting back on fresh investment (the Silva Ruete solution) or invest 
more heavily on the basis of a more favourable financial position (the 
Kuczynski-Belaunde solution). Since 1980 the government has chosen the 
solution of more investment rather than more revenue; the nationalist 
opposition would have made the opposite choice but neither could have 
got something for nothing. 
Finally, it has been suggested that after 1968 and despite the reforms, 
Peru simply invested too much in export-oriented industries and not 
enough in alternative sectors of the economy. These criticisms are given 
point in a recent study by Portocarrero, who analyses the main invest-
ment projects undertaken in Peru during the 1970s and concludes that 
these were capital-intensive, had long gestation periods, depended 
heavily on foreign technology and were substantially foreign financed.56 
Meanwhile, social infrastructure (education, health, etc.) and projects to 
develop the domestic market were both neglected. In general terms these 
criticisms are substantial and seem to be well founded. One could only 
say, in defence of the Selva development, that many other projects 
carried out by the military had similar disadvantages without the balance 
of payments benefit provided by oil (c.f. investment in the steel industry 
and in several coastal irrigation projects). Thus, even allowing the 
objection to resource-based, export-led growth to be substantially valid, 
it remains true that the exploration campaign was one of the more 
productive projects undertaken by any post-1968 government and the 
activities of Petroperu contributed significantly to the benefit provided. 
In many ways, therefore, the picture of oil development presented here 
ties in well with Becker's own portrayal of bonanza development. It is 
certainly interesting that Mineroperu demonstrated much the same 
concern for its operating independence and much the same ambition to 
maximise its own role as did Petroperu. Both companies were also willing 
to play for high stakes with the development of new and substantially 
untried technologies (although, as we have seen, technological risk 
may not be easy to avoid if state companies are persistently confronted 
with the need to develop marginal projects). Moreover, in both oil and 
mining, state companies have become pressure points within the system 
and have sought to increase the flow of resources into their own area of 
operation. In neither case were state companies hostile to foreign invest-
ment per se and rather tended to judge it by its potential contribution 
to their own efforts and projects, i.e., in helping to increase the total 
volume of resources devoted to the sector as a whole. State mining 
companies were also keen to develop good relations with the domestic 
private sector; there was very little domestic private sector in oil but 
there is no reason to believe that Petroperu's attitude, had such a sector 
existed, would have been very different. The operation of these com-
panies, therefore, has thus locked Peru even more deeply into a pattern 
of seeking development by bringing onstream new natural resources, 
predominantly for export. 
It is, however, far from obvious that the interests of the majority of 
Peruvians are best served by this form of development. The external 
dimension remains far from satisfactory even though the international 
system may be less crudely exploitative than might appear from depen-
dentista caricatures. A system which may be relatively open with respect 
to the spread of capital and technology will not necessarily facilitate 
economic development in peripheral countries. Mineral and oil exports, 
in particular, because of their heavy capital costs and long gestation 
periods, are particularly vulnerable to shifts in world demand. There is, 
thus, something of a lottery here. On occasion, oil and mineral projects 
may indeed generate heavy profits to be devoted to industrial develop-
ment (although this is by no means an easy task), but at other times the 
results may be extremely disappointing. 
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